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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES RISING: HOW 
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
COULD EXPAND TENTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
JARED O'CONNOR* 
Abstract: Whether and how the Tenth Amendment affects Congress's 
Commerce Clause power has been the subject of heated debate in the 
Supreme Court for over thirty years. In 1976, the Court held in National 
Leaf!}le of Cities v. Usery that the Tenth Amendment acts to immunize 
certain essential aspects of state sovereignty from federal regulation. 
This case was later overruled as stating an unworkable rule, but the 
1992 case of New York v. United States revived the Tenth Amendment as 
instead standing for an anti-commandeering principle. In 2000, a lone 
Fourth Circuit judge argued that a provision of the Telecomm-
unications Act of 1996 (TCA) violated this principle. This Note tracks 
the evolution of the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence, analyzes how the challenge posed by the TCA falls within 
that evolution, and concludes that such challenge may provide the next 
step in the Court's surreptitious revival of National League of Cities. 
{Rlegillation of land llse is perhaps the quintessential state activity.! 
INTRODUCTION 
An unassuming peak in the small town of vVarner, south of New 
Hampshire's vVhite Mountains and a twenty-minute drive northwest of 
Concord, Mount Kearsarge might appear an unlikely place to ground 
a federalism controversy. Compared to the imposing 6288-foot sum-
mit of Mount Washington or other peaks in the Presidential Range, 
the tip of Kearsarge reaches a modest 2937 feet, though its distance 
from the White Mountains allows panoramic views that reach from 
Vermont's Green Mountains to Boston. The geographic isolation that 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2002-03. I 
would like to thank my lovely wife for inhuman patience and unflagging support; my fam-
ily and friends for more of the same; my indefatigable editors for thoughtful review, par-
ticularly Benjamin Krass; and John Coltrane, whose Complete 1961 l'illage l't71lguard Record-
ings (Impulse 1997) was in near-constant rotation during authorship of this Note. 
1 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (Blackmun,j.). 
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provides hikers to Kearsarge's summit with such a view, however, also 
provides telecommunications equipment with ideal unobstructed ra-
dio wavelengths. In 1997, U.S. Cellular Corporation planted a 180-
foot lattice cell tower atop Mount Kearsarge, prompting local outrage 
ranging from litigation brought by citizens of Warner,2 to press de-
scribing the tower as a "huge, glittering one-finger salute. "3 
This local reaction is mirrored nationwide, as municipalities re-
sist the siting of wireless towers for reasons including aesthetic, envi-
ronmental, and financia1. 4 Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy echoed 
these sentiments when he asserted on the floor of the Senate, "I don't 
want Vermont turned into a giant pincushion with 200-foot towers 
indiscriminately sprouting up on every mountain and in every valley, 
ruining the view that most of us have spent a lifetime enjoying."5 The 
controversy stems from the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (TCA).6 Specifically, in § 332(c) (7) of the TCA,7 Congress pur-
ports to leave cell tower siting authority in the hands of state and local 
governments,S but mandates guidelines for, and places limitations on, 
state and local zoning authorities' exercise of that power.9 The ambi-
guity of one provision of § 332(c)(7) recently led a Fourth Circuit 
judgelO to conclude that the provision violates the Tenth Amendment 
of the Constitutionll in light of the anti-commandeering principle 
announced in the Supreme Court case New York v. United States.12 This 
2 See Nevins v. N.H. Dep't of Res. & Econ. Dev., 792 A.2d 388 (N.H. 2002). The Kear-
sarge case is anomalous in that the New Hampshire Department of Resources and Eco-
nomic Development gave express permission to U.S. Cellular to site the tower. Id. at 390-
91. The local response to such cell tower siting, however, was anything but anomalous. 
Amanda Parry, Court to Hear Cell Tower Arguments, CONCORD MONITOR, Nov. 9, 2001, at A4. 
3 Alex Beam, Cellular Towers in the Wild Send Bad Signal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2000, 
at F1. 
4 David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to 
Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 IOWAJ. CORP. L. 469, 470-71, 482-83 (1998). 
5143 CONGo REC. Sl1,402 (daily ed. Oct. 30,1997). 
6 Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (2001). 
7Id. § 332(c) (7). 
8Id. § 332(c) (7)(A). 
9Id. § 332(c) (7)(B)(i)-(v). 
10 Judge Niemeyer concluded that § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii) of the TCA violates the Tenth 
Amendment. Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 705 (4th Cir. 
2000) (Niemeyer, J.). His view did not command a majority of the three-judge panel; Judge 
Widener did not reach the constitutional issue, and Judge King expressly dissented from 
Judge Niemeyer's constitutional argument. Id. at 691-92 (per curium). 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people."). 
12 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992). 
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Note evaluates the argument that select portions of § 332(c) (7) are 
open to attack on Tenth Amendment grounds. Part I provides an 
overview and background of the TCA. Part II outlines the TCA itself, 
and describes the constitutional challenge recently raised in the 
Fourth Circuit. Part III outlines the Supreme Court's Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and Part N applies these principles to 
§ 332(c) (7), concluding that reconciling the Supreme Court's recent 
Tenth Amendment cases means reviving one aspect of a previously 
discredited doctrine. 
I. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ACT OF 1996 
Congress first turned its attention to the telecommunications in-
dustry with the Telecommunications Act of 1934,13 which created the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to deal with interstate 
phone and radio communications. Regulatory authority to construct 
and maintain intrastate phone infrastructure, as well as the power to 
set rates for intrastate phone service, however, remained at the state 
and local level.l 4 The wireless communications industry required an 
entirely new infrastructure, and the industry's growth has been expo-
nential. In 1985, just two years after the FCC issued its first license to 
operate a cellular tower, there were 203,600 individual cellular sub-
scribers, with 599 cell towers in commercial use. 15 There were 28 mil-
lion individual subscribers and nearly 20,000 towers by 1995, when the 
TCA was first under congressional consideration.16 
13 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613. 
14 La. Pub. Sen'. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 (1985). In addressing the FCC's 
power to preempt state authority, the Supreme Court noted: 
Id. 
The Communications Act [of 1934) not only establishes dual state and fed-
eral regulation of telephone service; it also recognizes that jurisdictional ten-
sions may arise as a result of the fact that interstate and intrastate service are 
provided by a single integrated system ... [through a jurisdictional separa-
tions process], it facilitates the creation or recognition of distinct spheres of 
regulation. 
15 Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, Semi-Annual \Vireless Industry Suney Re-
sults, Jan. 1985-June 2001, at http://www.wow-com.com/pdf/wireless_survey_2000a.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2002) [hereinafter CTIA Survey Results]. This includes not only cellu-
lar, but Personal Cellular Service, explained infra at text accompanying notes 22-25. 
16 CTIA Survey Results, supra note 15, As one might expect, the growth has only accel-
erated since the enactment of the TeA; as of June 2001, subscribers approached the 120 
million mark, and cell sites topped the 114,000 mark. Id. 
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The exponential growth in cell towers is due to a combination of 
increased popularity of cell phone service and the nature of the tech-
nology itself. "Cellular" technology is so named because large geo-
graphic service areas are divided into hexagonal cells, tessellated in 
the manner of a honeycombP Each tower is sited at or near the cen-
ter of one cell, and transmits within a narrow radio wavelength. I8 The 
signal is transmitted to the edge of its cell, where a tower in an adja-
cent cell picks up the signal and transmits it along as the individual 
user moves through the service area. I9 Each tower has a limited carry-
ing capacity, so as more individuals subscribe to the service area, the 
length of the radius within which each tower can transmit an accept-
able signal is shortened.20 This results in gaps between the cells, 
thereby requiring more towers to fill these gaps.21 
In addition, recent years have seen a sharp rise in the use of 
broadband Personal Cellular Service (PCS). 22 This all-digital service 
transmits across a higher frequency band than traditional cellular 
service.23 Higher frequency necessarily denotes a shorter wavelength; 
PCS offers greater quality, reliability, and flexibility of service, but at 
limited range.24 PCS towers, therefore, need not be as high as tradi-
tional cellular towers, but to equal the area covered by one traditional 
cell tower, as many as four PCS towers are required. 25 
In part, the TCA is Congress's response to the conflict between 
industry's need to site ever-increasing numbers of towers to provide 
uniform service to a rapidly expanding customer base, and munici-
palities' desire to maintain control over where such towers will be 
sited.26 Congress recognized the problem: "State and local require-
17 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 'VIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUREAU, 
FACT SHEET: NEW NATIONAL WIRELESS TOWER SITING POLICIES 8 (Apr. 1996), 
http://ireless.fcc.gov/siting/fact1.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2002) [hereinafter FCC FACT 
SHEET#I]. 
18Id. Cellular transmits in the 824-849 and 869-894 MHz range. Id. 
19Id. 
20 Id. at 11. 
21Id. 
22 WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FACT SHEET #2: 
NATIONAL WIRELESS FACILITIES SITING POLICIES 6 (Sept. 1996), http://wireless.cc.gov/ 
iting/fact2.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2002) [hereinafter FCC FACT SHEET #2]; see also In re 
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Serv-
ices, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7710 (1993) (second report and order). 
23 FCC FACT SHEET #1, supra note 17, at 9. PCS systems transmit in the 1850-1990 MHz 
range.Id. 
24 See FCC FACT SHEET #2, supra note 22, at 5-6. 
25 See id. at 6. 
26 See Telecommunications Act of1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (2001). 
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ments, siting and zoning decisions [have] created an inconsistent 
and, at times, conflicting patchwork of requirements which will in-
hibit the deployment of [PCS]."27 
In enacting the TCA, Congress intended "to provide for a pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to ac-
celerate rapidly private sector developmen t of advanced telecommu-
nications. "28 Such rapid acceleration would naturally be hindered by 
the patchwork of local regulations, the multiplicity of necessary tow-
ers, and local resistance to them. Thus, the TCA, as drafted in the 
House of Representatives, would have allowed the FCC total federal 
preemption of state authority to regulate tower siting.29 However, the 
Conference Committee rejected this approach, seeking to leave some 
zoning authority in the hands of state and local governments.30 The 
resulting compromise appeared as § 332(c) (7) of the TCA, about 
which the Conference Committee explained: "The conference agree-
ment creates a new [§ 332(c) (7)] which prevents [FCC] preemption 
of local and State land use decisions and preserves the authority of 
State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except 
in the limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement."31 
II. SECTION 332(c) (7) OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
As codified, § 332 (c) (7) is en titled "Preservation of local zoning 
authority."32 The title is something of a misnomer. Subparagraph A of 
the Section expressly claims that "[e]xcept as provided in this para-
graph, nothing in [the TCA] shall limit or affect the authority of a 
State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions 
regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal 
wireless service facilities."33 However, the bulk of § 332(c) (7) is sub-
paragraph B, concerning the limitations on or the instructions to lo-
cal zoning authority.34 
27 H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 94 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61. 
28 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222. 
29 [d. at 207, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222. 
30 [d. at 207-08, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222. 
31 [d., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,222. The Committee emphasized that "[a]ny 
pending [FCC] rulemaking concerning the preemption of local zoning authority over the 
placement, construction or modification of [commercial mobile service] facilities should 
be terminated." [d. at 207-08, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,222. 
32 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U .S.c. § 332 (c) (7) (2001). 
33 [d. § 332(c) (7) (A). 
34 [d. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i)-(v). 
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Subparagraph B provides that state or local governments "shall 
not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally 
equivalent services"35 and "shall not prohibit or have the effect of 
prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services. "36 When a re-
quest for authorization to site or modify a wireless facility is made, 
state or local governments are required to act on such a request 
"within a reasonable period oftime."37 For a state or local government 
to validly deny a request to "place, construct, or modify" a wireless fa-
cility, the statute requires that such a decision be "in writing and sup-
ported by substantial evidence. "38 Beyond these standards and proce-
dures, subparagraph B explicitly preempts state and local govern-
ments from regulating wireless facilities "on the basis of the environ-
mental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such 
facilities comply with [FCC regulations]."39 The final provision of 
subparagraph B grants both state and federal judicial review of any 
siting decision made at the local government level, and provides that 
"the court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. "40 
ld. 
35 ld. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I). 
361d. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II). 
37 ld. § 332(c)(7) (B) (ii). This provision reads in full: 
A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any re-
quest for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless 
service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly 
filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature 
and scope of such request. 
38 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7)(B)(iii). This provision reads in full: "Any decision by a State 
or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct or 
modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial 
evidence contained in a written record.· ld. 
ld. 
391d. § 332(c)(7)(B) (iv). This provision reads in full: 
No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the 
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facili-
ties on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to 
the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations con-
cerning such emissions. 
40ld. § 332(c) (7) (B) (v). This provision reads in full: 
Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or 
local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this 
subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act, com-
mence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear 
and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely affected 
by an act or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumental-
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The amorphous language of these provisions invites litigation, as 
has been noted by reviewing courts.41 The Second Circuit remarked 
that "this statute fairly bristles with potential issues, from the proper 
allocation of the burden of proof through the available remedies for 
violation of the statute's requirements. "42 This Note will address the 
requirement that a local zoning board's denial of a siting request be 
supported by "substantial evidence. "43 
In the Fourth Circuit case of Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Board 
of Supervisors, Judge Niemeyer opined that imposition of the "substan-
tial evidence" federal standard commandeered the state's legislative 
process and thereby violated the Tenth Amendment.44 This, however, 
was not the holding of the court, which reversed on more complex 
grounds. 45 
The district court had overturned the local zoning board's per-
mit denial on the grounds that it failed to meet the "substantial evi-
dence" burden imposed by § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii).46 On appeal to the 
Fourth Circuit's threejudge panel, Judge Niemeyer agreed with the 
district court that the "substantial evidence" test was not met, but 
voted to reverse because he also found that the standard itself violated 
the Tenth Amendment.47 Judge Widener also voted to reverse, but on 
the grounds that the "substantial evidence" test was met; he therefore 
did not reach the constitutional issue.48 Judge King believed that the 
"substantial evidence" test was not met, and separately dissented from 
Judge Niemeyer's constitutional argument, concluding that Con-
gress's power to "conditionally preempt" state regulation did not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment.49 
The constitutionality of § 332 (c )(7) was raised again in the Sec-
ond Circuit, which summarily dismissed the Tenth Amendment ar-
[d. 
ity thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv) may petition the Commission 
for relief. 
41 See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999). 
42 [d. 
43 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii). 
44 Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 705 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(N iemeyer, J.) . 
45 [d. at 691-92 (per curium). 
46 [d. at 691 (per curium). 
47 [d. (per curium) 
48Id. (per curium) 
49 Id. at 691-92 (per curium). 
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gument.50 The Second Circuit expressed "no doubt that Congress may 
preempt state and local governments from regulating the operation 
and construction of a national telecommunications infrastructure, 
including construction and operation of personal wireless communi-
cations facilities. "51 Though the language employed by the Second 
Circuit was broad, the only provision of § 332(c) (7) before the court 
dealt with the restriction on a local government's ability to deny siting 
based on environmental effects of radio frequency emissions.52 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari of this case,53 despite the 
urging via amici cUJiae of members of Congress and a host of munici-
palities who supported the position taken by Judge Niemeyer in Peters-
burg Cellular. 54 The Supreme Court was correct in denying certiorari on 
the narrow issue before the Second Circuit, 55 but the Court should 
address the "substantial evidence" requirement in the future, as its 
recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence raises serious questions 
about this provision's constitutionality.56 
III. The SUPREME COURT'S COMMERCE CLAUSE AND 
TENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Background 
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes. "57 The idea that Congress has the power to 
regulate telecommunications under its Commerce Clause power 
50 Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1070 (2001) (mem.). 
51 [d. 
52 [d.; see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7)(B)(iv) (2001); see also Southwestern Bell Wireless v. 
Johnson CountyBd. ofComm'rs, 199 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 1999) (also rejecting a 
Tenth Amendment challenge to federal preemption of local regulation regarding radio 
frequency emissions). 
5S Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001) (mem.), denying cert. to 205 
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000). 
54 Brief of Amici Curiae Patrick J. Leahy et al. at 3, 9-10, Cellular Phone Taskforce v. 
FCC, 531 U.S. 1070 (1998) (No. 00-393), hup:/ /leahy.senate.gov/press/200012/booklet. 
pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) (on file with author). 
55 See infra note 202. 
56 See infra Part IV; see also Jack M. Beerrnann & Clive B. Jacques, Section 1983 s "and 
Laws' Clause Run Amok: Civil Rights Attorney'S Fees in Cellular Facilities Siting Disputes, 81 B.U. 
L. REv. 735, 773-79 (2001) (arguing that Judge Niemeyer's interpretation of Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence is correct and that select provisions of § 332 are unconstitu-
tional). 
57 U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
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would appear to be unremarkable, given that Congress clearly has the 
power to regulate wholly intrastate commercial activities that, in the 
aggregate, affect interstate commerce.58 The Court has construed 
Congress's broad power to legislate under the Commerce Clause as 
limited, however, by principles of state autonomy identified in the 
Tenth Amendment.59 The Tenth Amendment states in its entirety: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people. "60 This barrier to congressional action has 
been held to exist independent of the power otherwise delegated by 
the Commerce Clause.61 
It is ironic that the Tenth Amendment has been read as an 
affirmative barrier to congressional action where, by its own text, it 
reserves to the states only those powers that have not been delegated 
by the Constitution to the federal government.62 Because the Com-
merce Clause is a clear delegation of constitutional power, the Tenth 
Amendment would not seem to factor into the analysis.63 This view 
was most clearly expressed in the 1941 case of United States v. Darby, 
where the majority upheld Congress's ability under the Commerce 
Clause to require that private employers adhere to certain labor stan-
dards.64 Although the Darby Court recognized that the actual objects 
58 Wickard y. Filburn, 317 U.S. lll, 125 (1942) (upholding Congress's ability under 
the Commerce Clause power to regulate homegrown and consumed wheat because of the 
aggregate effect such actiyity would have on national wheat markets); cf United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding as unconstitutional Congress's attempt to regu-
late simple possession of firearms in wholly intrastate school zones). 
59 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144,188 (1992). 
60 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
61 New linn, 505 U.S. at 156-57; see also P1intz, 521 U.S. at 923-24, 923 n.13 (suggesting 
that the term "Proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause provides an additional textual 
barrier to power, delegated to Congress). The Necessary and Proper Clause provides 
Congress the power "[t)o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § I, d. 18. 
62 See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57. 
63 Note, however, that the Court has read broad principles of state sovereign immunity 
into the Eleventh Amendment's bare textual prohibition of a state citizen's right to sue a 
different state, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, lO-l3, 21 (1890), and held that Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection principles apply against the federal government through the 
Fifth Amendment despite the absence of any "equal protection" clause in the latter, Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954). 
64 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1941) (establishing the constitutional-
ity of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,29 U.S.C. § 201). 
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of regulation were employees not alleged to be commodities in inter-
state commerce, it explained that the "power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce extends to ... activities intrastate which have a 
substantial effect on the commerce."65 This decision was "unaffected 
by the Tenth Amendment which ... states but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered. "66 
The importance and scope of the Tenth Amendment has been 
vigorously debated throughout the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury, leaving a wake of conflicting precedents, overturned cases, and 
most recently, anti-commandeering arguments in favor of state im-
munity from certain forms of federallegislation.67 
B. Early Signs of Limits on the Commerce Clause Based on State Autonomy 
In 1971, the Court skirted an issue which it would later tackle 
nearly head-on: whether the Commerce 'Clause grants Congress the 
power to impose criminal penalties on convicted felons possessing 
guns.68 In United States v. Bass, the Court engaged in narrow statutory 
interpretation to avoid further defining the scope of the Commerce 
Clause vis-a.-vis the states.69 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall 
justified the narrow reading: 
Because its sanctions are criminal and because, under the 
Government's broader reading, the statute would mark a 
major inroad into a domain traditionally left to the States, we 
refuse to adopt the broad reading in the absence of a clearer 
direction from Congress.70 
65 [d. at 119-20. 
66 [d. at 123-24. 
67 See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. 144; Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Darby, 312 
U.S. 100. 
68 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337-39 (1971). A similar gun control act thought 
to be a permissible exercise of power under the Commerce Clause was assessed and re-
jected by the court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cI.3. 
69 404 U.S. at 351. As recently as 2001, the same analysis was used to avoid a head-on 
collision between the Commerce Clause and federalism principles. See Solid Waste Agency 
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) ("Permitting [the U.S. 
Army Corps to claim jurisdiction over wholly intrastate, non-navigable waters] would result 
in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and 
water use .... We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional 
and federalism questions."). 
70 Bass, 404 U.S. at 339. 
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. .. [U] nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will 
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-
state balance.71 
325 
Four years later, Justice Marshall wrote another narrow opinion 
for the Court, in which Darby's language regarding the Tenth 
Amendment was addressed.72 In Fry v. United States, the Court was 
asked to determine whether the scope of the Commerce Clause al-
lowed Congress to place restrictions on state and local government 
employee wage increases in an effort to stabilize the economy.73 The 
Court noted the principle that "[s] tates are not immune from all fed-
eral regulation under the Commerce Clause merely because of their 
sovereign status,"74 and went on to uphold the statute, emphasizing 
that it was an emergency measure of quite limited scope.75 The Court 
rejected the petitioner'S Tenth Amendment argument, but retreated 
from the broad language of Darby: 
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not 
been surrendered," it is not without significance. The 
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that 
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs 
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a 
federal system.76 
These hints that the Court was willing to entertain the possibility of 
state immunity from federal regulation became reality the following 
year. 77 
71 Id. at 349. 
72 See generally Fryv. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
73 See id. at 545. The statute in question was the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, a 
temporary grant of authority to the President to issue orders and regulations restricting 
wages throughout the economy. See id. at 543-45. 
74 Id. at 548. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 547 n.7 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)) (internal ci-
tation omitted). 
77 See general(v Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled /Jy Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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C. "The Court's jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady path. "78 
1. State Sovereignty Trumps Congressional Power 
National League of Cities v. Um) marked the first time that the 
Court held a congressional act unconstitutional on state autonomy 
grounds despite a valid exercise of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause.79 Then:Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held 
that the Tenth Amendment barred Congress from using its Com-
merce Clause power to affect state employees with minimum wage 
and overtime amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, because 
Congress could not "exercise that power so as to force directly upon 
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the con-
duct of in tegral governmen tal functions are to be made. "80 The Court 
expressed concern that, absent an inviolable sphere of state autonomy 
free from federal regulation, the broad sweep of the Commerce 
Clause power could render the states as sovereign political entities all 
but irrelevant.81 Though agreeing that private corporations and indi-
viduals are proper objects of federal regulation, the National League of 
Cities Court read the Tenth Amendment as conferring upon states as 
states a special identity in relation to the federal government.82 In do-
ing so, the Court squarely overruled Maryland v. WiTtz, which had ex-
plained that although the scope of the federal taxing power was lim-
ited to areas not "traditionally" engaged in by the states, the 
Commerce Clause power had no such limitation.83 The National 
League of Cities Court did not define precisely in which "traditional" or 
78 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (O'Connor,].). 
79 Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855. 
80 [d. Then:Justice Rehnquist characterized this as consistent with Fry because the pro-
vision under consideration there was a strictly temporary measure intended to address a 
seriolls national emergency, and neither burdened state coffers nor supplanted states' 
decisions about how their government should be structured. [d. at 853. Justice Rehnquist 
so concluded despite the fact that he had dissented from Fry on the grounds that the 
Commerce Clause power did not reach as broadly as the majority suggested, and neither 
was the national economic situation so urgent as to allow Congress to intrude on state 
sovereignty through other Constitutional means. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 545, 559 
(1975) (Rehnquist,j., dissenting). 
8t Nat'[ League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855. 
82 Id. at 854. 
83 [d. at 855; see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) ("The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been 
authorized by Congress than can an individual.") (quoting United States v. California, 297 
U.S. 175, 185 (1936)). 
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"integral" state functions this new immunity would inhere, but was 
asked to do so in a string of cases to follow. 
2. Narrowing the National League of Cities Test 
In three cases following National League of Cities, the Court ap-
plied the "traditional/integral state function" test to challenges of 
Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause power, and upheld the 
congressional acts at issue in each one.84 Two are particularly relevant 
here: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation .A.ss'n and FERC v. 
Mississippi. 85 
First was the Hodel case, which saw, inter alia, a facial Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act (Surface Mining Act) .86 The Surface Mining Act was primar-
ily an environmental protection statute intended to protect against 
the adverse effects of surface coal mining.87 Two so-called "steep 
slope" provisions of the Surface Mining Act were alleged to run afoul 
of the Tenth Amendment.88 The first required that, on slopes steeper 
than twenty degrees, private individuals and businesses return mined 
areas to their approximate original contours and prohibited them 
from employing certain dumping and mining techniqlles.89 The sec-
ond allowed private "steep slope" operators to obtain a variance from 
the requirement that they return the land to its approximate original 
contour if those operators could demonstrate that "equal or better 
economic or public use" could be achieved by a different postmining 
restoration technique.90 
Appellants urged that these provisions violated National League of 
Cities's ban on congressional trammeling of traditional state functions, 
arguing that regulation of land use has long been recognized as an 
84 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243--44 (1983); 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758, 760-61, 764-66, 771 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 304-05 (1981). 
85 FERC, 456 U.S. 742; Hodel, 452 U.S. 264. The third case upheld the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, finding that federal minimum standards governing mandatory 
retirement of state employees did not directly impair the state's ability to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, nor did it impose serious 
financial burdens on the state. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 238,240-41. 
86 452 U.S. at 268. 
87Id. 
86 Id. at 283-84. 
89 Id. at 284. 
90 Id. 
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inherent state police power.91 The Court found this argument mis-
placed. The Court first reiterated the distinction made by National 
League of Cities between federal regulation of private persons and 
businesses-proper objects of both federal and state governmental 
regulation-and federal regulation of the states as states, thought by 
virtue of their sovereign power to have special standing to challenge 
congressional authority.92 The Court then outlined the three re-
quirements that any successful challenge under National League of Cit-
ies must meet: 
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute 
regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal regula-
tion must address matters that are indisputably [attributes] 
of state sovereignty. And third, it must be apparent that the 
States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair 
their ability to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions. 93 
The Court therefore did not address whether land use regulation 
is an indisputable or integral attribute of state sovereignty under the 
second prong of the test. Instead, it found that appellants had not 
shown that the Surface Mining Act regulates the states as states under 
the first prong.94 The steep slope provisions directly regulated only 
the conduct of private individuals and businesses, and did not compel 
any action by the states at all.95 The Court stressed this point: 
[T] he States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope 
standards, to expend state funds, or to participate in the 
federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a 
State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent pro-
gram that complies with the Act and implementing regula-
tions, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal 
Government.96 
91 Id. at 275-76. For the proposition that land use regulation rests within traditional 
state police power, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,9 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954); and Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392-94 (1926). 
92 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 286. 
93 Id. at 287-88 (citation and quotations omitted). 
94 Id. at 288. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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The Hodel Comt noted that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 
Congress may prescribe federal minimum standards that states may 
implement or else be preempted by a federally administered regula-
tory program.97 The Court stated that "nothing in National League of 
Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the States from pre-
emptive federal regulation of private activities affecting interstate 
commerce. ''98 Ultimately, the Surface Mining Act was considered akin 
to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts: acceptable forms of "coopera-
tive federalism" wherein Congress imposes no affirmative burdens on 
the state to regulate but simply allows states to regulate private parties 
as they see fit, subject to limits imposed by federal preemption.99 
In FERC, the Comt upheld the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978 (PURPA) against Tenth Amendment challenge. lOo Con-
gress passed PURPA in response to the energy crisis faced by the 
United States in the late 1970s; put simply, its intention was to pro-
mote energy conservation by encouraging the states to adopt certain 
regulatory practices affecting private utilities. 101 This was the first time 
the Court had directly addressed a federal statute that used "state 
regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. "102 Because the opera-
tion of PURPA is roughly analogous to the provisions of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, considered herein, it is instructive to 
look closely at how the Court construed the statute. 
Distilled to its essence, PURPA contained three basic require-
ments. First, section 210 authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission) to exempt power facilities that rely on 
renewable energy resources from state regulation, and required state 
regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities to implement 
FERC's rules encouraging the growth of such facilities. 103 Second, ti-
tles I and III of PURPA directed the states to "consider" adopting de-
97 Id. at 290. The Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
98 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290-91. 
99 Id. at 289 n.30. 
100 456 U.S. at 760-61,764-66,771. 
101 Id. at 745-46. 
102 Id. at 759. 
103 Id. at 751. 
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tailed federal retail regulatory practices.104 Third, these titles also im-
posed certain procedures on state commissions regarding the means 
by which such "consideration" of the federal standards should be im-
plemented, including deadlines by which states must report and a re-
quirement that states must furnish a written explanation to the public 
if the federal standards are rejected. l05 Notably, the mandate to "con-
sider" federal standards was just that and no more: "Despite the ex-
tent and detail of the federal proposals, however, no state authority or 
nonregulated utility is required to adopt or implement the specified 
rate design or regulatory standards. "106 
Regarding section 210, the Court held that the power it granted 
FERC to exempt certain power facilities from state regulation was an 
unexceptional exercise of federal preemption. l07 The Court recog-
nized potential problems with the second provision's requirement 
that '''each State regulatory authority shall ... implement such rule ... 
for each electric utility for which it has ratemaking authority. "'108 
Compelling state agencies to implement a federal regulation is closely 
analogous to the National League of Cities problem,109 but the FERC 
Court nevertheless upheld this provision because in practice, state 
agencies could "implement" the federal regulations simply by adjudi-
cating disputes between private utilities and private production facili-
ties arising under PURPA.110 It is clear that the Supremacy Clause 
compels state courts-as distinguished from state legislatures or ex-
ecutives-to recognize rights granted to private parties by federal 
law. lll The Court therefore held that because the Mississippi Public 
Service Commission customarily heard similar claims to those granted 
by PURPA, "it can satisfY § 21O's requirements simply by opening its 
door to claimants. That the Commission has administrative as well as 
judicial duties is of no significance."112 
104 Id. at 747. 
105 Id. at 748-49. 
106 FERC, 456 U.S. at 749-50 (emphasis added). Similarly, despite the imposition of re-
porting deadlines, PURPA provided no penalties to be levied against states that failed to 
meet these deadlines, and expressly stated that states were free to determine that "it is not 
appropriate to implement any such standard." Id. at 750. 
107 Id. at 759. 
108Id. (alteration in original). 
109 Id. Recall, however, that National League of Cities dealt with a federal statute that di-
rectly affected both private employers and state employers equally, whereas this provision 
of PURPA addressed how states regulate private parties. Id. 
110 Id. at 760. 
III u.S. CON ST. art. VI, d. 2; see Testa v. Kau, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947). 
ll2 FERC, 456 U.S. at 760. 
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Moving to PURPA's mandatory consideration of federal stan-
dards, the Court did not find a Tenth Amendment bar because 
PURPA did not compel the states to promulgate a legislative pro-
gram. ll3 Not only did the Act merely instruct the states to "consider" 
adopting the federal standards, but a state need not have even gone 
that far if it instead elected to simply abandon the field of utilities 
regulation altogether.1I4 The Court found that such "conditional pre-
emption" was permissible-because the Commerce Clause power 
could allow Congress to entirely preempt the field, the Court found 
no problem with a federal regulatory scheme that "simply [estab-
lished] requirements for continued state activity in an otherwise pre-
emptible field."115 The Court was not troubled by the fact that PURPA 
did not furnish federal oversight of the field even if a state did choose 
to opt out: 
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the 
States-that of either abandoning regulation of the field al-
together or considering the federal standards-may be a 
difficult one. And that is particularly true when Congress, as 
is the case here, has failed to provide an alternative regula-
tory mechanism to police the area in the event of state de-
fault. 116 
Despite this, the fact that the "mandatory consideration" provisions 
did not unavoidably apply to the states was enough for the Court to 
uphold them.1l7 
Given this analysis of the consideration requirements, it followed 
that PURPA's procedural requirements easily passed constitutional 
muster. Although titles I and III prescribed detailed notice and com-
ment procedures for a state to follow when acting on the federal stan-
dards, the state could also avoid these by simply opting out of the 
regulated field altogether. lIB Because Congress could "require a state 
administrative body to consider proposed regulations as a condition 
to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field ... [Congress 
113 Id. at 769. 
114 Id. at 764. 
115 Id. at 769. 
116 Id. at 766. 
117 See id. 
118 SeeFERC, 466 U.S. at 771. 
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may require] certain procedural minima as that body goes about un-
dertaking its tasks."119 
Notably, FERC was the first in this line of cases in which Justice 
O'Connor took part, and her partial dissent telegraphed the anti-
commandeering principles that would later appear in her majority 
opinion in New YOTk v. United States. 120 Justice O'Connor agreed that 
the exemption authority granted to FERC by section 210 was an un-
exceptional exercise of federal preemption as seen in Hodel. 121 How-
ever, she would have invalidated both the "mandatory consideration" 
and procedural requirements of titles I and III as violating all three 
prongs of the National League of Cities test. 122 She vigorously dissented 
from the Court's conditional preemption analysis, calling it an "ab-
surdity" that recognized no limit on "federal regulation of state gov-
ernments. "123 Instead, Justice O'Connor would have distinguished be-
tween the acceptable "cooperative federalism" exhibited in Hodel and 
the conditional preemption doctrine: 
The Surface Mining Act does not force States to choose be-
tween performing tasks set by Congress and abandoning all 
mining or land use regulation. . .. [I] t allows the States to 
choose either to work with Congress in pursuit of federal 
surface mining goals or to devote their legislative resources 
to other mining and land use problems. By contrast, there is 
nothing "cooperative" about a federal program that compels 
state agencies either to function as bureaucratic puppets of 
the Federal Government or to abandon regulation of an en-
tire field traditionally reserved to state authority. Yet this is 
the "choice" the Court today forces upon the States.124 
3. The Court Relinquishes Oversight of Federalism Concerns 
With the 1985 case of GaTcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tmnsit 
Authority, the Court reconsidered the minimum wage and overtime 
119Id. 
120 Id. at 775 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
121 Seeid. at 775 n.1 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 778-80 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
123Id. at 781 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). As an example of such "absurdity," she noted 
that under the conditional preemption analysis, National League of Cities was wrongly de-
cided because the state could have opted out of paying its employees by simply closing 
various branches of state government. Id. at 781-82 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
124 FERC, 466 U.S. at 783-84 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
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provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act that applied generally 
against both the states and private employers, the same issue ad-
dressed in National League of Cities. 125 Although National League of Cities 
had announced the principle that Congress may not regulate states as 
states in ways that interfere with traditional state functions, lower 
courts had struggled to determine precisely which functions were to 
be considered traditional versus nontraditional.l26 The Court itself 
had avoided this question in Hodel and FERC, but when squarely con-
fronted with it in Garcia, it surveyed the myriad of conflicting and ap-
parently arbitrary distinctions made by lower courts and decided to 
overrule National Leagu.e of Cities. 127 The Court also largely removed 
from judicial oversight the determination of the scope of state immu-
nity from congressional power under the Commerce Clause: 
Any rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," 
"integral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions 
inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make de-
cisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it 
dislikes .... We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle 
and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from 
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of 
whether a particular governmental function is "integral" or 
"traditional. "128 
The Court affirmed that limitations exist on Congress's power to 
interfere with state functions, and that states retain a "significant 
measure of sovereign authority, "129 but felt that protection of that sov-
ereignty was better served by the political process,l3o The "built-in" 
political safeguards of federalism were held to be adequate in guaran-
teeing that Congress's exercise of the Commerce Clause power would 
not unduly burden the states; presumably, although members of Con-
gress are by definition part of the federal government, that they rep-
resent their respective states is enough to ensure that they will protect 
125 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985). 
126Id. 
127 Id. at 538-39 ("We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing prin-
ciple .... The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, 
for example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health 
facility, is elusive at best."). 
128Id. at 546-47. 
129 Id. at 549 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 
226,269 (1983) (Powell,]., dissenting». 
130 [d. at 556. 
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state sovereignty as a matter of self-interest.l3l The majority stated: 
"[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the consti-
tutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 
'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result. "132 Dissent-
ing from this result, then:Justice Rehnquist noted his continued belief 
that states enjoyed a certain fundamental sovereignty that Congress 
could not intrude upon regardless of the scope of its Commerce 
Clause power, a view that he predicted ''will ... in time again com-
mand the support of a majority of this Court. "133 
Because Garcia focused on the political safeguards of federalism, 
it left open the possibility for judicial review where that process 
fails. 134 This loophole was recognized three years later in South Caro-
lina v. Baker, in which the Court agreed to hear a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to a federal tax requirement prohibiting states from issuing 
bearer bonds. The Court ultimately found no process failing on the 
facts because the State did not prove or even allege that it was de-
prived of the right to participate in the political process.135 Notably, 
the Baker Court also upheld the federal statute on the ground that it 
regulated state activities and did not "seek to control or influence the 
manner in which States regulate private parties. "136 
D. State Autonomy Revived 
1. New York v. United States 
Seven years after Garcia, and without explicitly overruling it, the 
Court jumped back into the debate by holding that the federal judici-
ary rather than the political process should be the guardian of feder-
alism. 137 The modern line of Tenth Amendment cases began with the 
seminal New York v. United States, holding once again that the Tenth 
Amendment presents an independent bar to Congress's otherwise 
valid exercise of its Commerce Clause power. 138 Writing for the Court, 
Justice O'Connor conceded that as a matter of simple logic, the "tau-
tology" that is the Tenth Amendment necessarily cannot limit Con-
131 See Garcia, 469 u.s. at 556. 
132 [d. at 554 (emphasis added). 
133 [d. at 580 (Rehnquist,L dissenting). 
134 See id. at 554. 
135 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988). 
136 See id. at 514. 
137 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992). 
138 [d. at 177. 
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gress's power,I39 Nor does the text of the Commerce Clause clarifY the 
issue; instead, the Court assumed the duty of policing the federalist 
political structure: 
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it 
makes no difference whether one views the question [as] as-
certaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal 
Government under the affirmative provisions of the Consti-
tution [or] discerning the core of sovereignty retained by 
the States under the Tenth Amendment. Either way, we must 
determine whether [a congressional act] oversteps the 
boundary between federal and state authority,I40 
The statutory provisions at issue in New York were enacted by 
Congress in response to a nationwide shortage of low-level radioactive 
waste disposal sites,HI Through a series of three incentive programs, 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (Waste Policy Act) sought 
to hold individual states responsible for disposal of radioactive waste 
generated within their borders, though disposal could occur outside 
of those borders through a system of regional interstate compacts,H2 
All three provisions were challenged on Tenth Amendment grounds, 
but only the "take-title" provision was held unconstitutiollal,143 
As a preliminary matter, the Court distinguished between Con-
gress's authority to subject state governments to generally applicable 
laws-that regulate both private parties and statesl44-and Congress's 
139 [d. at 156-57 ("The Tenth Amendment [like the Commerce Clause] restrains the 
power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment 
itself, which, as we have discussed, is essen tially a tautology."). 
140 [d. at 159 (emphasis added). This theory of judicial oversight of the federalist struc-
ture is based not only on Marbury v. Madison's general proposition that "[iJ t is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," but also from the 
majority's distrust of Congress's ability to draw the line appropriately-a position clearly 
articulated by the dissent of Justice O'Connor in Garcia: "With the abandonment of Na-
tional League of Cities, all that stands between the remaining essentials of state sovereignty 
and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint." Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O'Connor, j., dissenting); see Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803). 
141 New Yom, 505 U.S. at 150. 
142 [d. at 150-52. 
143 [d. at 171-77. 
144 [d. at 160. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), which, among other 
things, imposed a minimum wage requirement on private industry as well as state schools 
and hospitals, is one such example. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). As noted in Part m.B 
supra, Congress's ability to regulate states with such "generally applicable" laws has been 
the subject of much debate among members of the Court. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 
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authority to order states to regulate private parties in a particular 
way.145 The Court did not explain the relevance of such a distinction; 
it simply stated that the provisions at issue were not subject to the rea-
soning of the "laws of general applicability" cases because here, Con-
gress attempted to use the states to implement its regulations. 146 
Based on this analysis, FERC and Hodel were held to be binding 
precedent147 while the problem of GaTcia was avoided. 148 Recall that 
GaTcia overturned National League of Cities on the basis that the politi-
cal process, rather than judicial whim, should be the arbiter of feder-
alism. 149 It would therefore be difficult to argue straight-faced that the 
statute at issue in New YOTk failed on political process grounds, because 
the legislative compromise at issue was promulgated by the several 
states which came to Congress only for approval, and the State of New 
York itself voluntarily complied with the Act's requirements. 15o 
In announcing its anti-commandeering principle, the Court ex-
plained that although the federal statutes in both Hodel and FERC 
sought to motivate the states to regulate private parties in a manner 
that Congress deemed appropriate, the statutes were upheld in each 
case "precisely because [they] did not 'commandeer' the States into 
regulating. "151 In Hodel, states were not compelled to enforce the fed-
eral standards, spend state funds, or participate in the federal regula-
tory program at all; if the state opted out of the program, "the full 
183 (1968) (upholding the FLSA) , overruled !Jy National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976) (striking down the FLSA as applied to state employers), overruled !Jy Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (reinstating the FLSA as applied to 
state employers). The Court simply noted the inconsistency of this line of cases without 
further discussion. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
145 New York, 505 U.S. at 161. 
146 [d. at 160-61. The majority'S failure to explain the basis for this distinction did not 
go unnoticed by Justice White, who noted in a vigorous dissent that the Court had never 
decided any Tenth Amendment case on this ground. [d. at 201 (White, J., dissenting) 
("[T)he Court makes no effort to explain why this purported distinction should affect the 
analysis of Congress' power under general principles of federalism and the Tenth 
Amendment. The distinction, facilely thrown out, is not based on any defensible theory."). 
Implicit throughout the m~ority opinion, however, is the theory that unlike direct regula-
tion of states or private parties, accoun tability concerns are not raised unless Congress acts 
on private parties through the states. See id. at 166-69; see also infra text accompanying notes 
256-260. 
147 New York, 505 U.S. at 161. 
148 See id. at 154, 160. 
149 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546--47. 
150 See New York, 505 U.S. at 151,154. 
151 [d. at 161. 
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regulatory burden [would] be borne by the Federal Government."152 
Similarly, the program at issue in FERC was construed as requiring 
"only consideration of federal standards," and because the states could 
avoid even this burden by ceasing all regulation in the field, the Court 
had upheld the statute because "there was nothing in PURPA 'di-
rectly' compelling the States to enact a legislative program. "153 
The Court analyzed the history of the Constitutional Convention 
and the Federalist Papers for proof of this anti-commandeering con-
ception of federalism. 154 The Court explained that as finally adopted 
in the Constitution, the Commerce Clause power "authorizes Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize 
Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate 
commerce. "155 The federal system established separate state and fed-
eral sovereigns, each governing individuals and competing between 
themselves for the affection of citizens; this separation of governmen-
tal power is thought to ensure greater protection of individual lib-
erty.156 
Beyond the historical justification, the practical basis for the 
Court's anti-commandeering principle is political accountability.157 
Accountability provides the unifYing rationale behind Congress's 
Spending Clause authority to encourage or entice states into regulat-
ing by conditioning the receipt of federal-to-state funding grants on 
state acceptance of federal standards. 158 In addition, accountability 
also justifies Congress's authority under the Commerce and Suprem-
152 [d. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 
288 (1981). 
153 New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 
(1982». This implicit recognition of FERes conditional preemption analysis was under-
cut, however, by the later reasoning of the Court when addressing the Waste Policy Act 
itself. See infi"G text accompanying notes 233-241. 
154 New York, 505 U.S. at 163-66. The breadth of the historical analysis is beyond the 
scope of this Note, which deals narrowly with the principles announced and their applica-
tion to the TCA. 
155 [d. at 162-66. 
156 See id. at 163-64; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991) (explain-
ing that the chief purpose of the federalist system's establishment of twin sovereigns exer-
cising separate authority directly on the citizenry was to create a mutual restraint on tyr-
anny). 
157 New lork, 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
158 See New York, 505 U.S. at 173. The Spending Clause provides: "The Congress shall 
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... " U.S. 
CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For the current Spending Clause doctrinal framework, see gener-
ally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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acy Clauses to offer states the choice of either regulating private par-
ties according to federal standards, or being preempted by federal 
regulation.159 The crucial point in both instances is that "the residents 
of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State 
will comply."160 This ability to choose freely not to comply is thought 
to permit state governments and officials to represent the state citi-
zens' interests more directly.161 If those interests are contrary to na-
tional interests, then Congress may preempt state authority and regu-
late private parties directly, with federal representatives bearing 
responsibility for the programs.162 However, if Congress could simply 
compel the states to regulate according to its direction, the Court 
fears that "it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory 
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of 
their decision. "163 Given these principles and concerns, the Court ad-
dressed the three provisions of the Waste Policy Act (WP A). 
The first provision gave complying states a "monetary" incentive 
to pass legislation binding them to regional compacts, to develop 
siting plans, and to file applications for disposal site operation; such 
states received funds gathered from surcharges collected in the in-
terim by states accepting waste in to pre-existing facilities. 164 This 
"monetary" incentive was held to be a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress's commerce and spending powers, as it simply conditioned re-
ceipt of federal funds upon state compliance with deadlines for enact-
ing regulatory legislation.165 
The second provision, an "access" incentive, increased surcharges 
and denied access to pre-existing disposal sites for states that had not 
met the deadlines outlined in the first provision.166 The Court inter-
preted this provision as providing the states with the choice of either 
regulating according to federal standards, or holding private parties 
responsible for the creation of radioactive waste. These parties would 
be subject to federal regulation denying them access to disposal sites 
159 New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68. This, of course, assumes that the field is preempti-
ble-the crucial question that is yet to be openly decided. See infra text accompanying 
notes 242-251. 
160 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
161Id. 
162Id. 
163 Id. at 169. 
164 Id. at 152-53. 
165 Id. at 173. 
166 New York, 505 U.S. at 153. 
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in other states that had complied with those federal standards.167 This 
incentive did not violate the anti-commandeering principle because it 
did not compel state regulation or expenditure of state funds; if the 
state refused to comply, the burden would fall on the waste generators 
themselves. 168 Notably, the Court emphasized that "the State [need 
not] abandon the field if it does not accede to federal direction; the 
State may continue to regulate the generation and disposal of radio-
active waste in any manner its citizens see fit. "169 
The third provision, a "take-title" incentive, came into effect as a 
penalty: if a state had not made arrangements to dispose of all inter-
nally-generated waste by a certain date, that state would be forced to 
take title and possession of its waste, and the vVPA imposed liability 
upon that state for all damages resulting from failure to do sopo The 
Court construed this provision as giving states a choice between regu-
lating according to federal standards or being forced to accept con-
trol of the waste.l7l Either option alone was held to be beyond Con-
gress's power: one option commands states to regulate under con-
gressional instruction and the other is effectively a congressionally-
mandated subsidy to waste producers.172 As both options were consid-
ered "unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques," allowing 
states to choose one or the other was "no choice at all. "173 
The Court was careful to distinguish the "take-title" provision 
from the two provisions found to be constitutional. While the two 
constitutionally valid provisions used conditional exercises of congres-
sional power as a coercive technique, the "take-title" provision lacked 
a "critical alternative ... [a] State may not decline to administer the 
federal program. No matter which path the State chooses, it must fol-
low the direction of Congress. "174 The emphasis on an ti-
commandeering was strong enough for the Court to announce that 
the rule is categorical, allowing no balancing of in terests.175 It is the 
structure of dual sovereignty, rather than the give-and-take of political 
forces that is thought to provide the best protection of individual lib-
erty, so the Court felt justified in drawing a bright line: 
167 [d. at 174. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. at 153. 
171 [d. at 175. 
172 New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76. 
173 [d. at 176. 
m [d. at 176-77. 
175 See id. at 187. 
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The result may appear "formalistic" in a given case to parti-
sans of the measure at issue, because such measures are typi-
cally the product of the era's perceived necessity. But the 
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It di-
vides power among sovereigns and among branches of gov-
ernment precisely so that we may resist the temptation to 
concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution 
to the crisis of the day.176 
Justice O'Connor had originally laid out this categorical concep-
tion of federalism in her partial dissent in FERC, and Justice Black-
mun, writing for the Court, had derided this conception: "[1] t is a cu-
rious type of federalism that encourages Congress to pre-empt a field 
entirely, when its preference is to let the States retain the primary 
regulatory rolel77 .... Justice O'Connor articulates a view of state sov-
ereignty that is almost mystical .... "178 However, the New YOTk Court's 
conception of federalism-at least facially-has little to do with the 
strictly inviolable sphere of "traditional" state sovereignty envisioned 
by National League of Cities. 179 The Court in New YOTk recognized that in 
matters affecting interstate commerce, Congress has the power to en-
tirely preempt the field. 180 Rather than setting up an impenetrable 
barrier regarding the object of congressional regulation, the Court 
reads the Tenth Amendment as embodying an anti-commandeering 
principle dictating the manner' in which Congress may regulate.181 The 
Court stated, "Whatever the outer limits of [state] sovereignty may be, 
one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. "182 
2. Anti-Commandeering Extended and Clarified: Printz & Condon 
In 1997, Printz v. United States extended the anti-commandeering 
principle announced in New York from state legislatures to also apply 
to state executives.183 At issue in Plintz was a 1993 amendment to the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, ordering local law enforcement officers to 
176Id. 
177 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 n.29 (1981). 
178 Id. at 767 n.30. 
179 See New Y01*. 505 U.S. at 159-60. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 188. 
182Id. 
183 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
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conduct criminal background checks on gun purchasers.184 This 
amendment (the Brady Act) was an interim provision; at the time the 
case was argued before the Court, the amendment would have lasted 
roughly a year until a nationwide instant background check system 
was put into place.185 
This was not a law of general applicability: because the Brady Act 
directed state officials to follow certain procedures in their dealings 
with private parties, the case was decided under the anti-comman-
deering principle announced in New York. 186 Though the specific ar-
guments in this case addressing congressional commandeering of 
state executives are largely irrelevant to the issue under consideration 
here, Printz emphasized the categorical nature of the anti-comman-
deering rule. The government's argument in Printz in support of the 
Brady Act was essentially that it served "very important purposes [and 
imposed] a minimal and only temporary burden upon state officers," 
but the Court was unswayed. 187 It reasoned that where the purpose of 
a federal law is to commandeer state executives, a balancing test is 
inappropriate because the federal structure itself is affected: 
It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a 
law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various 
interests can overcome that fundamental defect .... We ad-
here to that principle today, and conclude categorically, as 
we concluded categorically in New York: The Federal Gov-
ernment may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.188 
The most recent Tenth Amendment case further clarified the 
landscape, indicating the situations to which the anti-commandeering 
principles announced in New York and Hintz would apply. Reno v. Con-
don addressed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), a 
regulatory program that controls the manner in which personal in-
formation held by state Departments of Motor Vehicles is disclosed 
184 Id. at 902-04. 
185 Sec id. at 902. The statutorily-imposed deadline for this nationwide system was No-
vember 30, 1998; P11ntz was argued in December of 1996 and decided on June 27, 1997. Id. 
Therefore, it would not have been long before the issue became moot, but the Court ap-
parently saw-and seized-the opportunity to extend New lork's reasoning. Sec New York, 
505 U.S. at 159. 
186 P11ntz, 521 U.S. at 925-26. 
187 Id. at 931-32. 
188 Id. at 932-33 (citation and quotations omitted). 
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and sold.189 The DPPA also applies to private persons in possession of 
drivers' personal information, regulating their use of such informa-
tion and imposing penalties for noncompliance.190 A unanimous 
Court opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the 
DPPA was therefore a law of general applicability, and was analyzed 
not under New York and Plintz, but rather Baker: 
In Baker, we upheld a statute that prohibited States from 
issuing unregistered bonds because the law "regulated state 
activities," rather than "seeking to control or influence the 
manner in which States regulate private parties" .... Like the 
statute at issue in Bake1~ the DPPA does not require the States 
in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The 
DPPA regulates the States as owners of databases. It does not 
require the [State] Legislature to enact any laws or regula-
tions, and it does not require state officials to assist in the en-
forcemen t of federal statutes regulating private individuals. 
We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with 
the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and 
Printz. 191 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As a matter of simple logic, Justice Stevens is correct that the 
plain text of the Tenth Amendment alone cannot impose an inde-
pendent barrier to the Commerce Clause power delegated to Con-
gress, whether that power is exercised directly on states, private par-
ties, or on private parties through the states.192 In determining 
whether the glass is "half empty or half full," the Tenth Amendment is 
simply the meniscus, and tells us nothing about the proper division of 
sovereignty.193 The New York Court conceded as much, but is neverthe-
less imposing a particular vision of federalism on the states, despite 
Justice O'Connor's self-deprecating assertion that "our task ... con-
sists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of un-
derstanding and applying the framework set forth in the Constitu-
tion."194 Political accountability is surely a worthy goal, but the Court 
189 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000). 
190 [d. at 146. 
191 [d. at 150-5l. 
192 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,211 (1992) (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
193 See id. at 159. 
194 See id. at 157. 
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would be wiser not to rest its conception of federalism on ground so 
obviously non-textual and open to attack. 195 If an unelected judiciary 
is to read its vision of federalism into the Constitution, a more sup-
portable ground may be the Necessary and Proper Clause.196 Al-
though the Commerce Clause power is clearly delegated to Congress 
by Article I, it could be argued that it is not "proper" for Congress to 
exercise it in a manner that intrudes on state sovereignty.197 This in-
terpretation remains open to attack on the political process grounds 
outlined in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth01ity, but it at 
least avoids the tautological problem of sole reliance on the Tenth 
Amendment. 198 
Nevertheless, if the anti-commandeering principles of New York 
and Plintz v. United States are to be followed-and given the Court's 
unchanged composition as of November 2002, they surely are-then 
aspects of § 332(c) (7) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are of 
questionable constitutionality. 
As an initial matter, Congress's power under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate these tower sitings does not appear to be open to 
serious attack, despite the fact that the sitings are entirely local; this 
sort of commercial network affecting interstate commerce is ideally 
suited to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 199 The 
problem with § 332(c) (7), as with all provisions open to Tenth 
Amendment attack, is not the ultimate object of regulation but the 
manner in which Congress chose to regulate.20o As noted infra, the 
legislative history of § 332(c) (7) demonstrates that in its original 
form, as drafted in the House of Representatives, § 332(c) (7) would 
have simply allowed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
broad federal preemption authority to issue permits for cell tower 
sitings.201 Had the final version of § 332(c) (7) done so, this may have 
195 See id. at 211 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
196 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997). 
197Id. (Scalia,].) (noting that the Court could move in this direction, or simply read 
the Necessary and Proper Clause together with the Tenth Amendment for extra support). 
198Id. at 956-58 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting) (arguing that members of Congress 
are unlikely to ignore the sovereignty concerns of their constituents). 
199 See Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 705, 711-12 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (wherein Judges Niemeyer and King, while disagreeing on the Tenth Amend-
ment issue, agreed that this field is a proper object of congressional regulation under the 
Commerce Clause). 
200 See New York \'. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62, 188 (1992). 
201 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207 (1996), reprinted il1 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 
222. 
344 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:315 
been a valid preemption of state law.202 However, since such intrusive 
federal regulation was politically unpopular in the Senate, Congress 
effected a compromise, explicitly instructing the FCC not to enact 
preemptive federal wireless facilities siting standards.203 Instead, Con-
gress attempted to have it both ways, purporting to leave siting deci-
sions largely in the hands of state and local governments, but seeking 
to retain a measure of control by instructing them to apply federal 
standards and follow federal procedures.204 
Section 332(c)(7) is not a permissible federal law of general ap-
plicability that applies to both states and private parties, as seen in 
Garcia and Reno v. Condon.205 Neither is § 332(c)(7) strictly limited to 
regulating internal state activities, which was upheld as constitutional 
in South Carolina v. BakC1:206 Section 332(c) (7) claims both to preserve 
and limit state and local zoning authority over telecommunications 
corporations' cell tower siting requests.207 Thus, by its own terms, 
§ 332(c) (7) is an attempt by Congress to direct the way in which states 
regulate private parties, bringing the law within the ambit of the New 
York analysis.208 
The requirement that state and local governments compile a 
"written record" based on "substantial evidence" in order to deny a 
private party's request to "place, construct, or modifY" a cell tower, 
plainly instructs state and local governments to adopt a federally im-
posed procedure and standard of review.209 This is precisely the kind 
of "commandeering" that was warned against in New York: Congress is 
prohibited from indirectly regulating private parties by "requir[ing] 
the States to govern according to Congress's instructions."210 The full 
extent of the federal government's commandeering of local authority 
202 In fact, one provision of § 332(c) (7) is a valid example of such preemption. The 
blanket prohibition on state or local regulation of cell towers on the basis of environ-
mental effects of radio frequency emissions is an unexceptional exercise of Congress's 
preemption power, as it requires no action on the part of state or local governments; it 
simply prevents regulation in that area. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c) (7) (B) (iv) (2001); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 168; Cellular Phone Taskforce v. 
FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001); Southwestern Bell 
Wireless v.Johnson County Bd. ofComm'rs, 199 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 1999). 
203 See H.R. Com. REP. No. 104-458, at 208, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222. 
204 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). 
205 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985). 
206 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988). 
207 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7). 
208 See New York v. United St,ltes, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
209 47 U.S.c. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii). 
210 New York, 505 U.S. at 162. 
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is illustrated when a local government's denial of a cell tower siting 
permit would otherwise enjoy a presumption of validity, capable of 
being overcome only by a showing that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.211 Depending on the interpretation of "substantial evi-
dence", state and local governments may be required under 
§ 332(c) (7) to compile testimony and studies to support their denial 
of a cell tower siting permit.212 Even absent such interpretive possibili-
ties, state and local governments are at the very least facially com-
pelled to expend funds in the creation of a written record.213 
That such congressional commands appear de minimus is irrele-
vant to the anti-commandeering analysis; New York and Printz made it 
clear that federal regulation of private parties through the legislative 
and executive offices of states offends the very principle of federal-
ism.214 The anti-commandeering rule is categorical, and its applica-
tion here demonstrates why.215 Section 332(c) (7) has eased market 
entry for locally-opposed cell towers which may have been denied a 
siting permit but for the TCA.216 As a result, the political conse-
quences of public disapproval may fall on the local officials who ap-
prove cell tower permits, rather than on the congressional representa-
tives responsible for promulgating the TCA.217 As stated in New York: 
"Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, 
elected state officials cannot regulate in matters not pre-empted by 
federal regulation. "218 
State and local governments are not bureaucratic extensions of 
Congress, and may not be employed as administrative agencies to 
carry out federal policy.219 If Congress wants to grant the wireless tele-
communications industry special standing in relation to local zoning 
decisions, it should either condition the states' compliance with such 
policy on the receipt of federal funds under its Spending Clause 
authority, or openly preempt cell tower siting regulation altogether 
211 See, e.g., Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 699 (4th Cir. 
2000). 
212 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B)(iii). 
213 See id. 
214 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 187. 
215 Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33; New York, 505 U.S. at 187. 
216 Note the explosion in growth of tower sitings since the TCA's enactment: in the 
twelve years prior to the TCA, 25,000 cell towers had been sited. An additional 89,000 tow-
ers were sited in just five years following its enactment. CTIA Survey Results, supra note 15. 
217 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
218 [d. at 169. 
219 [d. at 188. 
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under its Supremacy Clause authority.220 The former course of action 
would provide states with a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the 
federal program if desired, while the latter would have the benefit of 
transparency in political decisionmaking.221 That the cram-down ef-
fect of full federal preemption would likely be controversial is pre-
cisely why such a decision should be made in full public view, with 
federal officials assuming clear responsibility for the program.222 
Though New York dealt with nuclear waste sites rather than cell tower 
sites, its warning is precisely on point: "If a federal official is faced with 
the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, 
the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsi-
bility for the eventual decision. "223 
The obvious counter-argument to this view of § 332(c) (7) is to 
raise the doctrine of conditional preemption.224 Citing both Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. and FERC v. Mississippi 
with approval, the New York court explained that Congress may "offer 
States the choice of regulating ... according to federal standards or 
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."225 In the "manda-
tory consideration" provisions addressed in FERC itself, the Court 
held that Congress may properly impose requirements on states that 
choose to continue to regulate "in an otherwise pre-emptible field."226 
The Court upheld Congress's concededly difficult choice-"either 
abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering the fed-
eral standards"-even in the absence of any federal regulation that 
would fill the void in the case of such state abandonment.227 Such is 
precisely the case here. Section 332(c) (7)'s provisions can be simply 
construed as presenting states with the following choice: regulate ac-
cording to federal instructions or abandon zoning.228 FERC made 
clear that it is irrelevant that the FCC has been instructed not to 
promulgate rules preempting state or local zoning authority.229 The 
220 See id. at 167-68. 
221 See id. at 167-69. 
222 See id. at 169. 
223 New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83. 
224 Seeid. at 173-74. 
225 Id. at 167. 
226 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982). 
227 Id. at 766. 
228 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (2001); New York, 505 
U.S. at 174. 
229 FERC, 456 U.S. at 766; see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (A) ("Except as provided in this 
paragraph, nothing in this Act shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local govern-
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take-title provision in New York was unconstitutional precisely because 
states could not avoid the federal regulation by any means; either 
"choice" commandeered the state into the service of the federal regu-
latory program.230 But here, § 332(c) (7) does not unavoidably apply to 
states, who may instead freely choose to avoid regulating according to 
the federal standards by abdicating zoning and allowing telecommu-
nications corporations to site cell towers where they choose.231 
If the Supreme Court were to fully adopt FERCs reasoning, then 
§ 332(c) (7) could stand as constitutional, but the Court's Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence calls into question the validity of the con-
ditional preemption analysis as applied in the con text of land use 
regulation. As indicated by the holding in FERC--that "Congress may 
establish requirements for continued State activity in an otherwise 
pre-emptible field"-there still may be fields which Congress simply 
may not preempt.232 
In New York, the Court recast the conditional preemption analysis 
as applied to the "access" provisions of the federal statute.233 Though 
the choice presented was still seen as one in which "States [could] ei-
ther regulate ... according to federal standards ... or [private par-
ties] [would] be subject to federal regulation authorizing sited States 
and regions to deny access to their disposal sites," the access provi-
sions were upheld as constitutional specifically because states could 
opt out of the program without compromising their sovereignty.234If a 
state refused to adopt the federal program, the burden of this refusal 
ment or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and 
modification of personal wireless service facilities."). 
230 New York, 505 U.S. at 175. One commentator has suggested that FERC is simply "no 
longer good law ... [because] [t] he Court viewed FERC as a case of first impression, and it 
rejected Justice O'Connor's Tenth Amendment commandeering analysis, which she of-
fered for the first time in her dissent in that case, and which a majority later accepted in 
New York v. United States." Beermann & Jacques, supra note 56, at 782-84. This argument, 
however, ignores the fact that the New York Court approvingly cited FERC; this Note posits 
that FERC and the concept of conditional preemption remain viable, but only in certain 
fields of regulation to be determined by the Court. 
231 See FERC, 456 U.S. at 766. 
232Id. at 770 n.32. ("[Today's holding] does not snggest that the Federal Government 
may impose conditions on state activities in fields that are not pre-emptible.") To the ex-
tent that Hodel contained the same broad dicta regarding conditional preemption, it ap-
pears similarly open to attack; recall, however, that Hodel addressed not congressional con-
trol of states' regulation of private parties, but rather direct congressional regulation of 
private parties which displaced existing state regulation-an acceptable exercise of federal 
preemption. 452 U.S. 264, 288-89 (1981). 
233 New lork, 505 U.S. at 173-74. 
234Id. 
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would fall on the regulated private parties themselves, who would 
then be generating waste with no opportunity for disposal. 235 The 
Court reasoned: 
The State need not expend any funds, or participate in any 
federal program, if local residents do not view such expendi-
tures or participation as worthwhile. Nor must the State aban-
don the field if it does not accede to federal direction; the State may 
continue to regulate the generation and disposal of radioac-
tive waste in any manner its citizens see fit.236 
Such is not the case with § 332(c) (7); the language of the statute 
contains simple commands to state and local governments with no 
preemptive choice at all.237 Even if the absence of an accompanying 
federal regulatory program to fill the void is not dispositive, 
§ 332(c)(7) requires states to abandon zoning if they chose to avoid 
federal direction.238 No provision is made to allow states the opportu-
nity to continue to regulate cell tower sitings "in any manner [their] 
citizens see fit. "239 The New York Court, echoing the language of Jus-
tice O'Connor's FERC dissent, appears to recognize that offering 
states such a coercive choice is not a choice at all.240 The implication 
that state abandonment of the field would not be an acceptable alter-
native-indeed, that it would even be a relevant consideration in the 
conditional preemption analysis-flies in the face of FERCs reason-
ing.241 
Ptintz further undermines the validity of the conditional preemp-
tion doctrine as applied to state legislative or executive regulation of 
private parties in the context oflaw enforcement. Congress's authority 
to regulate firearms sales under the Commerce Clause was undis-
puted in that case, and implicitly recognized in the majority opin-
235 Id. at 174. 
236 Id. (emphasis added). 
237 See genemlly Telecommunications Act ofl996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (2001). 
238 See generally id. 
239 New York, 505 U.S. at 174. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7). The freedom for states 
to concurrently regulate private parties where federal regulation has not preempted them 
is also what saved the Surface Mining Act in HodeL 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981). 
240 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 781-82 (1982) (O'Connor,]., dissenting); see New 
York, 505 U.S. at 174. 
241 See PERC, 456 U.S. at 766 (recognizing as difficult, but upholding as constitutional, 
the choice presented to st;\tes by Congress of "either abandoning regulation of the field 
altogether or considering the federal standards."). 
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ion.242 This is consistent with precedent: as noted previously, the 
Court's Tenth Amendment analysis ordinarily begins with a conces-
sion that the act proposed is valid under the Commerce Clause, then 
moves on to determine if the Tenth Amendment raises an independ-
ent barrier to congressional action.243 Presumably, the Court could 
have construed the Brady Act as providing the states with the same 
"choice" offered in FERC or implied by § 332(c)(7): either regulate 
according to congressional instruction or abandon the field to federal 
regulation. 244 However, Printz did not suggest that states could opt out 
of the Brady Act's provisions by eliminating their police force, thereby 
avoiding any congressional commandeering.245 Instead, the Court saw 
that the Brady Act simply imposed requirements that state law en-
forcement officers had to administer to private parties, and therefore 
used the anti-commandeering reasoning of New YOTk to strike down 
the statute.246 Though § 332(c) (7) addresses state and local legislative 
bodies rather than state executives, the scope of the anti-comman-
deering rule appears coterminous.247 
The strong implication is that a majority of the Court feels that 
there are certain core powers of state sovereignty that the federal gov-
ernment may not usurp.248 Plintz implies that law enforcement is one 
of those powers.249 Whether land use regulation is as well is an open 
question, one that § 332(c) (7) of the TCA squarely poses. The choice 
offered between regulating according to congressional instruction 
and abandoning such a traditional aspect of state sovereignty as land 
use regulation may be so highly coercive as to violate the anti-
commandeering rule. New YOTk made clear that "[a] choice between 
two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at 
all. "250 If Congress cannot turn the states into bureaucratic puppets to 
242 See id. at 923. But see id. at 936-37 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing that the 
Tenth Amendment barred the congressional action at issue but suggesting in addition that 
the Commerce Clause power does not extend to the wholly intrastate transfer of firearms). 
243 See, e.g., New York, 505 V.S. at 173-74 (conceding that private activity may be regu-
lated under the Commerce Clause as long as it does not intrude on the Tenth Amend-
ment's protection of state sovereignty); see also supra text accompanying notes 135-138. 
244 See FERC, 456 V.S. at 766. 
245 Beermann & Jacques, supra note 56, at 784. See generally Printz, 521 V.S. 898 (declin-
ing, sub silentio, to apply New York's "choice" framework to the Court's analysis of the Brady 
Act). 
246 Printz, 521 V.S. at 932-33. 
247 See id. at 935. 
248 See New York, 505 V.S. at 174. See generally Printz, 521 V.S. 898. 
249 SeegenemllyPrintz, 521 V.S. 898. 
250 New York, 505 V.S. at 176. 
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regulate third parties on its behalf, and the choice posed is construed 
as "become a bureaucratic puppet or abdicate a traditional sovereign 
power," then the Court must address whether Congress could consti-
tutionally require the second option. 
Whether the Court would actually frame the question this way is 
of course open to debate. It is possible that the Court would attempt 
to read § 332(c)(7) narrowly to avoid the federalism question. 251 The 
argument as framed above invites the Court to openly revive one as-
pect of National League of Cities v. Usery: reliance on judicial determina-
tion of which state functions are immune from congressional regula-
tion.252 Although Garcia squarely overturned National League of Cities 
on political process grounds, New York-while distinguishing Garcia 
away on its facts-seriously undermined Garcia's reasoning.253 The 
Court has reassumed what it sees as its constitutional duty to police 
the boundaries of federal and state sovereignty.254 Similarly, New York 
and Printz's implicit rejection of the conditional preemption rule-
when the only means for a state to avoid implementing the federal pro-
gram is to abandon a traditional aspect of its sovereign police 
power-indicates that the Court may be ready to formally recognize 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's prediction in his Garcia dissent.255 
Garcia need not be formally overruled, nor National League of Cit-
ies fully reinstated, to hold that states still enjoy an inviolable sphere of 
sovereignty; the Court could leave to the political process acts of Con-
251 See Solid Waste Agency ofv. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173-
74 (2001). It is hard to view the plain language of the "substantial evidence" requirement 
as anything other than simple commandeering-though some circuit courts have read this 
requirement as requiring "substantial evidence" under the local zoning authority's own 
ordinances. See Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 708 (2d Cir. 
2000). But reading § 332(c) (7)'s substantive provisions as requiring no more than what 
local ordinances already provide would render the Section entirely redundant at best and 
self-contradictory at worst, given that subparagraph B lists specific "limitations· on state 
and local zoning authority. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) 
(2001). 
252 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
253 New York, 505 U.S. at 159; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557. 
254 New York, 505 U.S. at 159. 
255 See id. at 174; see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting). See generally 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Though New York's treatment of the "access· 
provisions casts doubt on the validity of the conditional preemption analysis, conditional 
preemption may not be considered commandeering if states are given the choice of aban-
doning a field that does not fall within their traditional police power. This approach recon-
ciles New York and FERC if one assumes that the utilities regulation addressed in FERC is 
not a traditional state function. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742,764-66 (1982). 
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gress which do not commandeer states into regulating private parties, 
but instead subject both private parties and states to federal law, as 
upheld in Garcia and Condon. 256 Though National League oj Cities was 
concerned with direct congressional regulation of states as states, 
Condon makes clear that such regulation does not raise the account-
ability concerns underlying the anti-commandeering principle.257 
Where Congress regulates states directly, regulates citizens directly, or 
regulates any blend of the two in what are termed "generally applica-
ble" laws, the regulation may still be traced in a direct line from Con-
gress to the regulated state or private party.258 Furthermore, account-
ability does not suffer where Congress, through its Supremacy Clause 
authority, preempts states from regulating in a particular field. 259 
Where, however, Congress seeks to regulate private parties through 
the offices of the states-that is, to coerce states into regulating pri-
vate parties according to federal standards-the Court has expressed 
a strong preference for publicly open, politically accountable federal 
preemption over even minimal congressional commandeering of 
states.260 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from New York v. United States that Congress cannot use 
its sovereignty to govern private conduct through another sovereign. 
The only way to view the "substantial evidence" requirement as 110t 
commandeering states to regulate private parties according to federal 
standards in blatant violation of New York is to say that states could 
avoid the program by abdicating zoning. Ultimately, the question is 
this: is offering states a choice between regulating private parties ac-
cording to federal standards or abdication of zoning really a choice at 
all? Because New York forecloses the former, the answer to that ques-
tion depends on whether Congress could constitutionally require 
states to do the latter. Printz v. United States demonstrates that Con-
gress could not do so in terms of law enforcement. It hardly taxes the 
imagination to say that land use regulation occupies the same tradi-
tional state sovereign ground as law enforcement, but the Court has 
not yet said so explicitly. And thus, the debate circles back to National 
256 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 533 (1985). 
257 Condon, 528 U.S. at 151. 
258 See id.; New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
259 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
260 Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33; New York, 505 U.S. at 187. 
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League of Cities v. Usery, with the Court announcing in which areas 
Congress may not intrude on state sovereignty. The Court has already 
done so implicitly, but it should be explicit. Given that the force of the 
Court's anti-commandeering principle is rooted in concerns about 
clear political accountability, an unelected judiciary, when drawing 
lines to enforce this principle, should require of itself the same clarity 
as it requires of Congress. 
This Note does not urge a full revival of National League of Cities, 
which limited Congress's Commerce Clause power to regulate states 
as states; clearly this line of reasoning was overruled and continues to 
be disfavored as evidenced by Reno v. Condon. What is suggested is that 
National League of Cities' assertion that the judiciary is charged to pro-
tect some as yet undefined and inviolable sphere of state sovereignty 
is ripe for reexamination. This judicial duty will only come into play 
when Congress acts (as it did in New YOTk, P1intz and, as suggested, in 
the TCA) to direct states to regulate private parties. This is the only 
time that accountability is a true concern. Accountability is not a con-
cern, as federal preemption doctrine makes clear, when Congress is 
either regulating private parties directly or regulating the states as 
states, as in South Camlina v. Bakel". But the TCA does not present a 
case where states simply must obey the federal law, but one where 
states are ordered to implement it against private parties. By categori-
cally enforcing the anti-commandeering rule, the Court wants to 
make clear to the citizen which sovereign is regulating: is it the fed-
eral government or is it the states? Section 332(c) blurs the line, and 
this is exactly what it may not do. 
